The Pragmatic Concept of God



The Pragmatic Concept of God

“What I have done is to show that it is possible for the way the universe began to be determined by the laws of science. In that case, it would not be necessary to appeal to God to decide how the universe began. This doesn’t prove that there is no God, only that God is not necessary” (Stephen Hawking, www.woopidoo.com). Humans have always questioned their existence and questioned whether or not there is a God.  Pragmatism is a philosophical ideology that stresses importance in the rational and empirical world.  Charles Sanders Peirce argues that because we can perceive of God a being like God must exist. “I cannot think a thing is black if there is no such thing to be seen as black,” (Peirce, p. 378). Peirce wrote these words in reference to the existence of God.

Similarly, William James, a contemporary of Peirce, argued that pragmatism is aligned with a pluralistic viewpoint of religion, one that can stand for the belief of God, but one that can also stand in a neutral position. “I firmly disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest form of experience extant in the universe” (James, p. 143). Both of these philosophers are making arguments that God’s existence is a possibility.  The method to determine this belief varies considerably.  Both of these men have backgrounds in Logic, although they do not make arguments that would be valid in Logic. But Logic itself is not perfect.

Peirce shows that there is a distinct difference between being in a state of belief and being in a state of doubt. “Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in some certain way, when the occasion arises. Doubt has not the least such active effect, but stimulates us to inquiry until it is destroyed” (Peirce, p. 10).  One can either believe or doubt and when one believes they don’t listen to doubt, but when one doubts they strive to believe. Further inquiry leads one from doubt into belief and this is the only reason to have doubt, so we can gain more knowledge about the situation until we come to a belief about that situation.  “The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief” (Peirce, p. 10). I agree, the immediate motive would be to wash away the feeling of doubt, but the long-term and more important of the motives is whether or not doubt can lead us to find validity in an argument.

Pertaining to the question of God.  I have doubts that I hope to erase someday with belief.  My belief can have two outcomes, a belief in God’s existence or a belief in God’s non-existence, any other outcome would lead me to carry more doubt.  Instead of the question of God’s existence, what if I question the existence of belief.  I could either have a belief in the existence of belief or I could have a belief in the non-existence of belief.  But if I choose the latter, I could not have that belief because belief is non-existent. I am able to get to this point in my inquiry because having doubt in belief itself does not mean that belief is valid or invalid.  The argument for belief can very well be valid whether or not I have a belief in belief.  Similarly, a belief for or against the existence of God should only be concerned with the validity of the argument being made.

The argument that one cannot imagine something without it being in existence is a fallible argument. Lets go back to a quote I mentioned earlier,  “I cannot think a thing is black if there is no such thing to be seen as black,” (Peirce, p. 378).  Peirce makes the point that you can view something as black and upon closer inspection it can turn out to be a dark green or another color.  Something can be black because you understand that black does exist. Another way to look at this quote is, ‘I CAN think a thing is black because there are things that CAN be seen as black.’  Because I can perceive something as black I can think of other things as black.  But I must be able to perceive that black does exist.  What if I change the term ‘black’ to mean ‘God?’

‘I cannot think a thing is GOD if there is no such to be seen as GOD.’ This is similar to Descartes argument that what we believe is God, God is. Peirce mentions, “He fails to remark that this is precisely the definition of a figment. In particular, God cannot be a deceiver; whence it follows, that whatever we quite clearly and distinctly think to be true about any subject, must be true” (Peirce, p. 15). Ultimately Peirce’s argument is based on the fact that because the whole of humanity has judged Descartes’ argument to be false, that it must be false. But the only difference between Descartes assessment and Peirce’s is that you say we must first perceive and then we think, while Descartes says we think and then it must be true.  But our perceptions can fail us. How is it we can perceive the existence of God?

“We can know nothing except what we directly experience. So all that we can anyway know relates to experience. Where would such an idea, say as that of God, come from, if not from direct experience? Open your eyes—and your heart, which is also a perceptive organ—and you see God” (Peirce, www.harvardsquarelibrary.org). The argument goes like this.  If I believe God to exist then I have perceived him. If I have perceived God to exist then he must exist.

William James also attempted to conclude that God fits into the framework of the pragmatic thinker. “It is clear that pragmatism must incline towards meliorism.  Some conditions of the world’s salvation are actually extant, and she cannot possibly close her eyes to this fact: and should the residual conditions come, salvation would become an accomplished reality” (James, p. 137).  Meliorism is the midway point between what James coins as ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism.’ Optimism refers to the belief that the world’s salvation is inevitable while pessimism refers to salvation being impossible.  But in the previous quote, James seems aligned to the side of the believers in salvation. He mentions, without elaborating, that ‘conditions of the world’s salvation are actually extant.’ It seems that if the conditions did not exist then his argument for a pragmatic belief in God would wither away.

If I have a belief that a fire will engulf my house and I have a fire burning in the fireplace there would be a condition of a house fire in my house. Having my whole house burn down due to a fire in the fireplace is a possibility, although not likely. But, if the residual conditions occur, such as the fire in the fireplace spilling out into my home and starting it on fire, than I will know that a fire engulfing my house is a reality.  Because popular religious stories about ‘Salvation’ commonly include stories of drought, famine, disease and war I must assume that if more of these situations occur that salvation is a reality.  James’ belief takes a giant leap of faith that completely trusts the intentions of those that started our world religions.  James is careful to not advocate for any particular religion because we don’t have enough information to decide which one is true, but that doesn’t mean that one of them does have truth.

What is salvation anyways? “You may interpret the word ‘salvation’ in any way you like, and make it as diffuse and distributive, or as climacteric and integral a phenomenon as you please” (James, 137). Salvation generally refers to something saving another thing from harms way.  But in James’ case, salvation could mean the rapture, the end of existence, it could be a personal thing or for all of humanity to experience.  Salvation for me could simply be my death.  I would have been save from the harm I would have experienced on earth so it would be my own personal salvation.  Obviously James did not intend this definition of salvation, he was referring to the stories in the Bible. It is clear throughout his readings that he speaks of salvation and deliverance in terms of a Christian God, although he does not explicitly state this fact.

“On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and determine it” (James, p. 143). One example that I came across in taking a course on propositional logic a few years ago makes a confusing argument for the existence of God.  But its true purpose is to highlight problems with propositional logic.

The argument goes like this. “If I will have ETERNAL life if I BELIEVE in God, then God must exist.  I do not believe in God.  Therefore, God exists” (Pospesel, p. 229). The English argument for this seems to be faulty, but logically it works out.

(B→E) → G, -B ├ G.

(S2) I do not believe in God

(S3) I will have eternal life if I believe in God

(F3) B → E

“The problem is this: The second premise of the argument, S2, does not entail S3, the antecedent of the first premise.  But S2 does entail F3, the symbolization of S3” (Pospesel, p. 230). Obviously the English argument is invalid, it has true premises but comes to a false conclusion.  But the logical symbolization is valid. This is because the translation between English into Logic creates problems.  These problems are identical to the problems that James is facing. In Peirce’s case, using logic to try and prove or disprove can be as problematic as using one’s own instinct to prove or disprove, as James has done.

The true nature of god, the purpose of human existence, issues of good and evil and other metaphysical questions all exist because we cannot accurately express our thoughts and feelings.  Instead we resort to language games, which confuse, but are the most accurate representations of our thoughts.

When Peirce argues that because we see black that we can think of black but what is it that he is referring to as black?  Is it the color black that he can think of or the quality of black or something entirely new?  “What is it to mean the words “That is blue” at one time as a statement about the object one is pointing to—at another as an explanation of the word “blue”?” (Wittgenstein, p.18).

If I perceive God exists and then I think that God exists is it God that I perceive?  Is it a quality of God?  Is it a reflection of God?  Or, is it that I am trying to explain what I perceive in terms of God?  It is not that what I perceive is actually God, but I am not capable of interpreting what I perceive to mean anything else. It is through language that I would be able to say one thing and mean something entirely different.

“Can I say ‘bububu’ and mean ‘If it doesn’t rain I shall go for a walk”?—It is only in a language that I can mean something by something” (Wittgenstein, p.18). ‘Bububu’ can mean anything, but I cannot first perceive ‘bububu’ to mean anything, it is I and I alone that can put meaning into ‘bububu.’ In the same manner, I cannot perceive God to exist because God could have an infinite amount of meaning attached to the name.  Just because I perceive and then think does not mean that what I think about must exist. Peirce asks the reader a question, “we all think that there is an element of order in the universe. Could any laboratory experiments render that proposition more certain than instinct or common sense leave it?” (Peirce, p. 376). Peirce urges us to not even try to answer this question, because eventually one will find out that they do not have all of the answers necessary to answer this question.  But, if we are solely to rely on common sense and instinct instead of laboratory experiments to gain insight into the world around us we are going to fall into a superstitious trap. The answer to Peirce’s question is yes, laboratory experiments can render a proposition more certain than instinct or common sense.  This has been proving since we have landing on the moon, taken images of distant galaxies and are about to engage in a project to create a mini big bang. All of this is well beyond Peirce’s imagination, just like many other philosophers, Peirce tends to imagine his knowledge as the pinnacle and forefront of human capability.

Peirce and James both argued that there is room to believe in God and maintain a pragmatic view.  But they were able to make this arguments by taking great leaps of faith that were not based in any rational or logical pursuit.  Nietzsche said it best when he described his belief in God. “There cannot be a God because if there were one, I could not believe that I was not He” (brainyquote.com).

Works Cited

James, William, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Pragmatism. Ed. Frederick Burkhardt. New York: Harvard UP, 1975.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. Philosophical Writings of Peirce. Ed. Justus Buchler. Minneapolis: Dover Publications, Incorporated, 1986.

Pospesel, Howard, and William G. Lycan. Introduction to Logic : Propositional Logic. 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson plc, 2000. 229-30.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1958.

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Author Bio: David Brooks

David Brooks is the socially liberal, fiscally conservative political scientist, professional writer and co-founder of politablog.

One Response to “The Pragmatic Concept of God”

  1. Geraldine says:

    Stephen Hawking is recently in the news for suggesting (if I properly understand him) that the universe could have originated without the assistance of God. Given his own deplorable condition, I can’t help wondering if he feels he could similarly get by without the assistance of God himself…

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