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The philosophical arguments that Wittgenstein discusses are based in the subtleties of language.  He illustrates his point by using language games.  These games are used to make the argument that the philosophical problems that philosophers spend their time attempting to solve are superfluous. The problems they are attempting to solve are unnecessary because when one properly analyzes the language used in these problems they realize that there are no problems. The problems that were thought to exist are just the result of linguistic confusion, mostly dealing with the metaphysical world.

In dealing with questions of perspective Wittgenstein whittles down the argument into terms of grammar.

“But if I suppose that someone has a pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had.”  “…In exactly the same way it is no explanation to say: the supposition that he has a pain is simply the supposition that he has the same as I.  For that part of the grammar is quite clear to me: that is, that one will say that the stove has the same experience as I, if one says: it is in pain and I am in pain” (Wittgenstein, p. 111).

For the sake of this argument, a stove and another person represent a similar object.  It is an object that is separate and undiscovered when it comes to terms of shared emotions, experiences and sensations.  An individual doesn’t know for sure if another individual is suffering pain in the same sense that he is suffering pain.  This leads to the problem of other minds.

The problem of others minds is a response to many philosophical questions.  Generally, the problem of other minds asserts that one can never know what another is thinking.  One can ask whether the red they see is truly the same red that is regularly seen by everyone else.  No matter how in depth one looks into this argument they conclude that one can never know what exactly is happening in another person’s mental state.  Similarly, one cannot know how another person feels.  Tests can be done to determine pain tolerance or to see what synapses fire at what time.  But one cannot ever know how another feels a sensation like pain. Rather the pain that one feels is a condition and reflection on their environment.

These arguments lead to grammatical discrepancies that can make things unclear.  “What is it to mean the words “That is blue” at one time as a statement about the object one is pointing to—at another as an explanation of the word “blue”?” (Wittgenstein, p.18).  How can one even comprehend the pain in other people?  Even if person ‘A’ describes their pain to person ‘B’ in great detail a lot of the information is lost in the use of language.  True, language may be the best way to communicate how person ‘A’ feels.  But, person ‘A’ could inflict the pain they are feeling on person ‘B,’ but person ‘A’ could never truly know if that pain was equal to the pain they are feeling.  If person ‘A’ uses language games to describe their pain, are they really wanting to describe their pain (the object) or are they explaining what pain represents? Most of the time they are doing both, but the problem arises in the different values people attribute to various statements.  Person ‘A’ describing a pain to person ‘B’ loses a lot of the information because of the way person ‘B’ absorbs the information.

If person ‘A’ has a ruptured left ear drum and is describing the pain to person ‘B’ who also has a ruptured left ear drum, person ‘B’ will gain more of the information because they have a better understanding of the specific pain.  Even though the exact nature of person ‘A’s pain will never be comprehended.  “Can I say ‘bububu’ and mean ‘If it doesn’t rain I shall go for a walk”?—It is only in a language that I can mean something by something” (Wittgenstein, p.18).

If the problem of other minds lends itself to the thought that one can never know what another is thinking, the same can be said towards animals.  If humans, arguably advanced apes, can not know what each other is thinking, neither can animals.  Nor can the animal to human relationship bypass the problem of other minds.

“It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack the mental capacity. And this means: “they do not think, and that is why they do not talk.”  But- they simply do not talk. Or to put it better: they do not use language- if we except the most primitive forms of language.- Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing” (Wittgenstein, p.12).

It is known that there are animals that can create noises from their mouths that can imitate human communication.  A grey parrot is able to speak, although it is all learnt through repetition and they are simply mimicking the language. What about their capabilities to choose the correct shape from a pile of cubes, circles, triangles and other various blocks?  What about their ability to pick out the correct color out of a set of colors when prompted to do so?  Obviously some form of communication is taking place, even if it is based on the idea of mimicking.

A similar argument can be made regarding communication of chimpanzees.  In the wild they have large social hierarchies and communicate with each other in many different ways, some even spoken.  Spoken in the sense that a noise from the vocal chords like a grunt or a howl can be construed as speaking.  We know that they are not able to speak our language. But, because we cannot know what they are thinking, we cannot assume that they do not use language.  The language may not be similar to human languages, but it is communication.

Wittgenstein uses grammatical arguments to combat the basic questions of philosophy.  He claims that animals do not have language, even though the problem of other minds says that one could never truly know what another is thinking.  Language is obviously a major part of thinking and consciousness, so why should we make the assumption that an animal, that displays communication, has no language?  We will never know.

Similarly, when one person describes an object as ‘blue,’ we do not know what they are describing.  Are they referencing the characteristic of the object, or defining the nature of the word ‘blue.’ These confusions lead to the problems one faces in philosophy.  The true nature of god, the purpose of human existence, issues of good and evil and other metaphysical questions are all there because we cannot accurately express our thoughts and feelings.  Instead we resort to language games, which confuse, but are the most accurate representations of our thoughts.

Works Cited

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1958.