No figure in American politics has caused as much controversy and disgust as that of Richard Nixon. One of Nixon’s greatest adversaries, the journalist Hunter S. Thompson, phrased the anti-Nixon sentiment; “It is Nixon himself who represents that dark, venal and incurably violent side of the American character almost every other country in the world has learned to fear and despise” (Thompson, p. 2).
After impeachment and a failed presidency many Americans felt a similar disdain for Nixon. It wasn’t the surprise of a scandal that shook Americans to their core; it was the failed promises and the culture of deceit created by the Nixon administration that hurt Americans.
Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton spoke about the credibility issue facing the U.S.
“The present U.S. objective in Vietnam is to avoid humiliation. The reasons why we went into Vietnam to the present depth are varied; but they are now largely academic. Why we have not withdrawn is, by all odds, one reason. To preserve our reputation as a guarantor, and thus to preserve our effectiveness in the rest of the world”
(Schell, p. 10).
The U.S. was not in Vietnam to save the South Vietnamese, or to stop China from gaining more land. The U.S. was in Vietnam to win and with winning credibility would remain. If the U.S. decided to prematurely abandon the war; other states around the world would lose faith in the U.S. The notion of maintaining U.S. credibility in the Vietnam War is based around the ideological battle the U.S. was fighting at the time.
The spread of Communism via the domino effect was one of the main reasons why the U.S. got into Vietnam in the first place (Schell, p.8). The fear that capitalism was going to succumb to the Communist war machine was prevalent. So, when North Vietnam became a threat to Capitalism, the U.S. was forced to act.
The U.S. was one of the world’s two superpowers at the time and had to maintain a balancing effect against the Soviet Union. The most successful method to attain this balance and eventually tip the scale towards the U.S. was through Nuclear weapons.
“The government hoped that by creating a formidable impression of national strength and will in the minds of the nation’s adversaries it could deter them from launching a nuclear attack”
(Schell, p.9).
By displaying a powerful front against the Communists in Vietnam, the U.S. would impose fear in any other Communist state looking to attack a Capitalist one.
“We will not react to this threat to American lives merely by plaintive diplomatic protest. If we did, the credibility of the United States would be destroyed, Nixon said.”
(Schell, p.91).
Based on the theory of maintaining U.S. credibility was Nixon’s decision to increase the scope of the war into ‘neutral’ Cambodia. The North Vietnamese army and Communist party had setup sanctuaries in Cambodia; it was Nixon’s mission to “wipe out the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam” (Schell, p.90). Nixon had promised to end the war; he argued that by expanding the war it will be over sooner.
This flawed logic is best summed up by his view of the role the U.S. plays in world affairs; “if, when the chips are down, the world’s most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world”
(Schell, p.90-91).
In Nixon’s mind the expanding of the war into Cambodia was necessary, even though he had ordered the secret bombing of Cambodia for more than a year. Now, with the war against Cambodia public, Nixon had a credibility test that he could show the rest of the world. It is because of Nixon’s belief that this war was a test that he doggedly continued the foolish war. If the United States failed in Cambodia and in Vietnam, the rest of the world would view the United States as a “second rate power” (Schell, p.92-95).
What followed Nixon’s decision to invade Cambodia was even more stunning. After Nixon had called college students who protested the war “bums” and soldiers people who “are just doing their duty;” the Governor of Ohio said, in regards to Kent State protests, “We are not going to treat the symptoms. We are going to eradicate the problem” (Schell, p. 97). The very next day at the Kent State campus during a demonstration against the war the National Guard shot fifteen students killing four of them. The President had increased a war that he promised to end and he had created a culture of turmoil and violence.
The credibility gap that Nixon promised to eradicate had grown to engulf many more facets of American life than during the Johnson Presidency. The war was no longer the only problem facing the administration. Nixon had attempted to disintegrate the rights earned by minorities during the Civil Rights Movement, all the while appearing to be ‘bridging the gap’ between whites and minorities (Schell, p.39). The administration had proposed the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act, a bill that was criticized as one that would “repeal the fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth Amendments to the Constitution” (Schell, p.44). After Congress passed the D.C. Crime bill, Nixon sought to change the welfare system.
The system of ‘workfare’ proposed by Nixon was often mocked as being a liberal program in a conservative disguise. Many of Johnson’s Great Society programs had been disintegrated in favor of war-funding. To attempt and bridge the gap Nixon was creating he proposed these sweeping changes. Instead of bridging any gap Nixon made things worse for himself. Proposals he wanted to fail succeeded and ones that he pushed hard to succeed failed miserably, all because of the disconnect between the public and his Presidency.
Trying to overcome this disconnect proved challenging. He had decided to align himself with a group of Americans whom he called the ‘Silent Majority.’ This was a group that was believed to have ‘centrist’ and republican values that excluded the protestors and the civil rights community.
“Moreover, he was persuaded that the principal established institutions of American political life, including the Congress, the Supreme Court, and above all, television and the press, were impeding his communion with the new majority, and were thereby thwarting the majority’s will”
(Schell, p. 78).
The gap continued to grow, fueling the problem was the group of lower middle-class Americans who were considered ‘Hard-Hats.’ The term originated when a group of construction workers attacked a peaceful anti-war demonstration injuring about fifty protestors. ‘Hard-Hat’ was used to describe the anger felt by the poor against liberals. Along the same lines as the ‘Hard-Hats’ and other violent oppressors, Nixon urged the empowerment of The Interagency Group. The group was designed to open mail, tap telephones without warrants and to break into people’s houses and offices (Schell, p.112).
In treating their opponents in this manner Nixon opened the door for his critics to challenge him. The eventual downfall of Nixon was not due to one particular issue or problem, but rather a series of disconnects and poor decisions that resulted in National turmoil and insecurity.
The journalist Hunter S. Thompson wrote a book entitled, “Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail ’72.” This book was attributed as being the most authentic and realistic book of its kind to date. Thompson, who as an ardent Nixon hater, naturally favored George McGovern. Thompson interviewd McGovern after he had lost the Presidential race to Nixon in 1972.
“I dont think any of us really know what’s going on. I think there’s always that pendulum action in American politics, and I expect Nixon to run into trouble in the next few years. I think there’s going to be disillusionment over the war settlement. I think the economic problems are not going to get better and the problems in the great cities are going to worsen, and it may be that by ’76 somebody can come along and win on a kind of a platform that I was running on in ‘72”
(Thompson, p. 479).
McGovern’s predictions were eerily accurate as soon after Nixon was reelected in 1972 he was forced to resign amid a flurry of scandals.
Works Cited
Schell, Jonathan. 1975. “The Time of Illusion.” New York: Vintage Books.
Thompson, Hunter S. 1973. “Fear and Loathing: On the Campaign Trail ’72.” New York: Fawcett Popular Library Books.
Loading ...